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INTRODUCTION
The economies of the Tibetan areas2 in Western 
China have been growing very rapidly since the mid-
1990s—significantly more rapidly than China as a 
whole, which has had one of the fastest sustained 
growth experiences the world has ever seen. Unlike 
the rest of China, economic growth in the Tibetan 
areas—as best represented by the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR), which accounts for about one half of 
Tibetan areas and population in China—has been 
disconnected from local processes of productive 
accumulation. Rather, rapid growth has been the result 
of a massive degree of subsidisation, mostly from the 
Central Government and heavily concentrated in 
urban services and construction. In combination with 
political disempowerment and outside control of 
most sectors of the economy besides agriculture, the 
1. Correspondence to: Andrew M. Fischer, Postbus 29776, 
2502 LT, The Hague, The Netherlands. E-mail: fischer@iss.nl. 
2. In this article, use of the terms “Tibet” and/or ‘Tibetan 
areas” refers to all of the Tibetan areas in China, including the 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan areas that are 
incorporated into the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and 
Yunnan. 
TAR has essentially been turned into a quintessential 
aid economy par excellence, resulting in numerous 
polarisations, inefficiencies and other perversions 
(see Fischer 2009b). 
However, while this growth experience is 
evidently an artificially-sustained subsidy bubble, its 
socio-economic consequences are not. Rather, rapid 
subsidy-sustained growth has been associated with 
very real and rapid changes in the socio-economic 
structure of Tibetan society. Again, these changes have 
been more rapid than changes occurring elsewhere 
in China albeit without the relative autonomy that 
local people and governments in other regions of 
China can rely on to mediate the consequences. Most 
fundamental has been the rapid transition of the 
local (mostly Tibetan) labor force out of the primary 
sector (mostly farming and herding).3 In the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR), for instance, the share of 
3. The primary sector is the national accounting term for 
economic activities in farming, animal husbandry, forestry and 
fishing. The secondary sector includes mining, construction and 
manufacturing. The tertiary sector includes non-physical services. 
The primary sector in Tibetan areas is about half farming and half 
animal husbandry (pastoralism). 
Rapid subsidy-sustained growth since the mid-1990s in the Tibetan areas of Western China has been 
associated with a rapid transition of the local (mostly Tibetan) labor force. In the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR), the proportion of the local labor force registered as employed in farming and herding dropped from 
76 percent in 1999 (the most agrarian workforce in China at the time) to 56 percent by 2008. This shift out 
of agriculture was mostly absorbed by rapid increases in the proportions of locals employed in services and 
construction. While some of this change probably reflects seasonal migratory workers who are still fairly 
well embedded in their rural places of emigration, the speed of transition has nonetheless been exceptional 
compared to other parts of western China. Moreover, the speed of transition in Tibetan areas outside the 
TAR might well be even faster. These changes are analysed through a longitudinal and comparative trend 
analysis of aggregate employment, wage and national accounting data, comparing the TAR to several other 
provincial cases in western China and the national average, as a means to reflect on the profound changes 
that are occurring to Tibetan people’s lives in very real and rapid ways. To the extent that many of these 
socio-economic changes may be irreversible, they highlight particular concerns regarding the preponderant 
dependence on subsidies sustaining economic growth in the Tibetan areas, the dominance of Han Chinese 
in the urban economies of these areas, and the fact that local Tibetans have very little capability to mediate 
these changes politically vis à vis the dominant sources of power dictating regional development policy.
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Indeed, the migratory employment patterns discussed above 
are fairly typical in early stages of urbanization. Moreover, 
one of the most powerful mechanisms of transition in this 
regard is education rather than employment. For instance, 
my own qualitative observations among secondary students 
in the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan suggest 
that once young people leave their rural areas for a few years 
to boarding schools in towns, especially at the secondary 
level, they rarely return to farming or herding and their 
families usually consider them lost causes with respect to 
these occupations. Such students might return temporarily 
to their rural households to help out, particularly during 
summer holidays or spells of postgraduate unemployment, 
but I have rarely come across secondary students who 
express the desire or intention to move back into farming or 
herding as an occupation.5 The article by Iselin in this issue 
makes this same point (Iselin 2011). Hence, the structural 
shifts observed in the employment data plausibly represent 
the unleashing of profound social transformations that, 
once started, are unlikely to reverse—even considering the 
rural embeddedness of migratory labor or else the potential 
prospect of dire economic conditions in the urban areas.6 
These transformations will obviously not spell the death of 
farming and herding in Tibet, but they will undoubtedly 
change the nature of farming and herding within the broader 
socio-economic system. 
To the extent that many of these socio-economic changes 
might be irreversible, they highlight a variety of concerns 
particular to the disempowered circumstances of Tibetan 
areas and to the role of government policies in mediating 
the pace and character of change. A major concern is the 
dependence on massive levels of subsidization (relative to 
the local economy) that have been driving economic growth 
and structural change in Tibetan areas and on which many 
Tibetans have increasingly come to rely through the course 
of these labor transitions. To the extent that urbanization 
becomes increasingly central to these changing employment 
patterns, the continuing if not strengthening dominance 
of Han Chinese in the urban economies of Tibet and the 
associated urban exclusionary pressures faced by Tibetans also 
become increasingly contentious, as arguably evidenced by 
the outburst of large-scale protests in March 2008. Similarly, 
the heightened state of disempowerment faced by Tibetans 
in the governance of their regions leaves them with little 
capability (relative to populations in other regions in China) 
to mediate these changes politically vis à vis the dominant 
sources of power determining subsidies and related regional 
development policies.
This article analyses these structural socio-economic 
transformations through a longitudinal trend analysis of 
aggregate employment, wage and national accounting data, 
5. These observations are based on fieldwork in Qinghai in 2004. See 
Fischer (2009a).
6. Again, see Dyson (2011) for an excellent discussion of these aspects of 
urbanization from a global demographic (rather than economic) perspective.
the local labor force considered as employed in the primary 
sector dropped from 76 percent in 1999 (the most agrarian 
labor force in China at the time) to 56 percent by 2008—a 
reduction of twenty percentage points in ten years. This shift 
out of agriculture was mostly absorbed by rapid increases in 
the shares of local labor employed in services and, to a lesser 
extent, construction. Compared to other parts of western 
China, the speed and character of transition as represented by 
official data has been exceptional, to the extent that within one 
decade the TAR has, to a considerable extent, caught up with 
the (also rapidly changing) norm in China, albeit without the 
productive and sustainable economic foundations to support 
these changes as elsewhere in China. Moreover, the speed 
of such transitions in Tibetan areas outside the TAR might 
well be even faster given the implementation of large scale 
resettlement schemes in pastoral areas (which have largely 
bypassed the TAR to date) and the closer integration of these 
areas into neighboring Han Chinese urban centers. For better 
or for worse, the consequences of these transitions in Tibet 
deserve urgent attention, particularly if they prove to be 
irreversible. 
Indeed, the question of irreversibility deserves some 
attention for the framing of this article. Some of the decline in 
the Tibetan primary labor share probably reflects migratory 
workers who are still fairly well embedded in the rural 
economies from which they seasonally emigrate for part of the 
year in search of off-farm employment. These local migrants 
might not be registered as primary sector workers even 
though they continue to work in the primary sector for at 
least part of the year or, conversely, they might be registered as 
working in the primary sector even though they also engage in 
informally-organized off-farm work. In either case, the official 
data probably exaggerate the degree to which the local labor 
force has become disembedded from the rural economy. This 
in turn might be taken to imply that these labor transitions 
could be reversible if urban employment opportunities were 
to become more austere, in the sense that these migrants 
could easily return to farming or herding. Nonetheless, such 
migratory employment patterns do not necessarily lessen the 
sense of rapidity that the official data reflect regardless of their 
precise accuracy given that similar migratory considerations 
also apply in other parts of western China. 
On the other hand, from a global demographic perspective, 
we can expect that, once started, these transitions will probably 
continue, in the broad structural sense that populations rarely 
move back into farming or herding once they have moved out 
of these activities (short of some massive traumatic event).4 
4. Since the onset of demographic transitions and urbanization 
alongside related economic transformations, we have almost never observed 
situations where a labor force has re-agrarianized, in a structural sense, 
except during episodes of trauma, crisis or extreme social engineering, such 
as under Pol Pot in Cambodia, certain periods under Maoism in China, or 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. However, even in these cases, 
once the proximate factor is removed, the structural trend in the population 
to move out of agriculture reasserts itself, often with a vengeance. For further 
discussion on demographic perspectives of urbanization, see Dyson (2011). 
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comparing the TAR to several other provinces in western 
China and the national average. The TAR is chosen as the 
basis of comparison because it represents an entirely Tibetan 
experience (in the rural areas), as opposed to the other 
Chinese provinces containing Tibetan areas, where rural data 
is dominated by the Han Chinese majority.7 Nonetheless, 
similar transitions can be observed in other Tibetan areas 
as well, albeit with less intensive subsidization and more 
intensive integration with neighboring Han urban centers 
than in the TAR. 
The method used in this study derives from a structuralist 
development economics approach, focusing inductively on 
the evolution of aggregates, averages and compositions, rather 
than on the statistical variations and associations of individual 
and/or household characteristics within a sample. This 
approach is not used to suggest a structurally-deterministic 
understanding of the transitions studied, nor a homogeneous 
experience among the social groups represented. Rather, 
in combination with an institutionalist understanding of 
context, it is used as a means to reflect on the factors and 
forces shaping the rapidly changing socio-economic norms 
within which people experience and act in a wide variety of 
ways. The primary data used are taken from official sources 
provided by the National Bureau of Statistics in various 
yearbooks. While many criticize these official statistics of 
China, their accuracy is arguably sufficient for teasing out 
broad structural trends, while obviously keeping in mind that 
all social statistical work must be approached interpretatively.8 
Indeed, the official statistics are all that we have to understand 
the broad nature of socio-economic change in Tibet and thus 
it is urgent to exploit them as best we can. 
These transformations of Tibet are analyzed in three 
sections. The first briefly outlines some of the outstanding 
features of recent rapid growth in the TAR since the mid-
1990s. The second section analyses in more detail the changing 
characteristics of employment structure in the TAR that have 
accompanied such rapid growth, in comparison to several 
other provinces in western China. In the third section, these 
employment trends are combined with national accounting 
data as a means to measure sectoral imbalances across the 
economy, demonstrating the exceptionally heavy urban bias 
guiding development strategies since the mid-1990s in the 
TAR, particularly in the early 2000s. Despite some attempts 
to compensate these imbalances (see Childs et al 2011, this 
issue), sectoral polarization has continued unabated since the 
early 2000s even despite the huge transition of labor out of 
agriculture, while new forms of inequalities appear to have 
rapidly emerged within urban areas. The conclusion reflects 
on some concerns regarding sustainability and the importance 
of prioritizing Tibetan urban employment in this context. 
7. Further discussion of this point, see Fischer (2005; 2008; 2009a).  
8. For more discussion, see Fischer (2005: 6-12).
RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE TAR
Following a period of sustained economic stagnation (in 
real terms) in the early part of the reform period in the TAR, 
Beijing started to implement a variety of policy initiatives 
from 1994 onwards in order to propel the TAR economy back 
towards the per capita national average from which it had 
been lagging. These initiatives culminated in the “Open the 
West” campaign (OWC; xibu da kaifa),9 announced in 1999, 
which was complemented by the Tenth Five-Year Plan in 2000 
and supported in the TAR by the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 
2001. Since then, the speed of recent economic growth in the 
TAR has been phenomenal, even by recent Chinese standards. 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the TAR more than 
quadrupled from 1997 to 2007. In comparison, the Chinese 
economy tripled over the same period. As a result, GDP per 
capita of the TAR caught up with the average in China, rising 
from just under half of the national average GDP per capita in 
1997 to just over 61 percent by 2008, reaching 13,862 yuan 
in 2008 (versus 22,701 yuan nationally).10 
However, this rapid growth in the TAR was dislocated 
from productive sectors, particularly the primary sector 
(agriculture), which was the largest sector in GDP terms up 
to 1996 and employed about three quarters of the workforce 
in 2000 (mostly Tibetan). While aggregate GDP in the TAR 
increased 3.4 times from 2000 to 2008, the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP only grew by about two thirds, falling in 
share from 42 percent of GDP in 1995 to 15 percent in 2008. 
Industry and mining almost doubled in value-added from 
2000 to 2008, albeit from a very small base, with much of the 
increase occurring in 2006 and 2007, and this sectoral sub-
category remained at 7.5 percent of GDP in 2008. In contrast, 
the GDP value-added of construction more than quintupled 
from 2000 to 2008, increasing from a previous peak of 17 
percent of GDP in 1995 (or 11 percent in 1996) to 22 percent 
in 2008, becoming larger than agriculture and almost three 
times larger than industry and mining (construction is only 
a fraction of industry and mining in every other province of 
China). While the increase in construction was disassociated 
from productive activities, it was closely associated with 
the tertiary sector (a combination of government and party 
administration; social services such as education and health; 
trade and commerce; transport; and other services). The 
value-added of the tertiary sector more than quadrupled from 
2000 to 2008, rising from 34 percent of total GDP in 1995 
to 56 percent by 2008, becoming by far the largest sector of 
the TAR.11 Indeed, the tertiary sector contributed almost the 
9. This campaign is usually translated by most scholars—including 
myself up until recently—as the “Western Development Strategy”. However, 
I have opted for “Open the West Campaign” after discussions with Lara 
Marconi, given that this offers a more accurate translation of the Chinese 
words xibu da kaifa, which convey a sense of opening and (resource) 
exploitation. 
10. Data are from CSY (2009: Table 2-15) and equivalent in previous 
yearbooks. 
11. Calculated from CSY (2009: Table 2-15) and equivalent in each 
previous yearbook back to CSY (1997). Data for 1995 is from TSY (2003: 
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presence in these provinces and possibly a strengthening of 
this presence in the opening years of the OWC as well.15   
In sum, most of the growth generated in the TAR over 
these years derived from an alternating sequencing between 
tertiary activities (dominated by government administration, 
commerce and tourism) and construction (dominated by 
large construction projects such as the various components 
of the Qinghai-Tibet railway). Both of these drivers were 
mostly determined by policies of subsidized spending and 
investment decided in Beijing and, to a much lesser extent, 
supported by various rich coastal provinces in China. Given 
the weight of these instituted sources of growth in the local 
economy, changes in provincial economic structure have been 
much more radical and volatile than elsewhere in China, 
including the next most resembling province of Qinghai.  
The magnitude of these drivers relative to the local 
economy in the TAR is worth emphasizing. The extremely 
high and increasing magnitude of both direct and indirect 
subsidies in the TAR almost defies logic, given that they started 
to exceed total GDP from 2001 onwards. Even in comparison 
to Qinghai, the next most subsidized province of China, the 
TAR is exceptional in the degree to which it has exhibited 
an extreme level of subsidy dependence that has not abated 
over time despite the intensity of investment activity. Local 
government expenditure throughout this period remained 
over 90 percent funded by direct budgetary subsidies (i.e. 
from Beijing to the TAR local government), and these direct 
budgetary subsidies reached an astonishing level equivalent 
to 81 percent of GDP in 2002 and 90 percent in 2008. 
Similarly, the value of total investment (mostly subsidized) 
reached levels unparalleled anywhere in China in recent 
history, at almost 80 percent of GDP in 2006 and remaining 
close to that level in 2008.16 Within this context of extremely 
intense subsidization (which has existed since the late 1960s), 
the fact that there was rapid growth comes as no surprise. 
Rather, it is the sheer inefficiency of such subsidization that is 
striking. I have referred to this as “boomerang aid” in Fischer 
(2009b), in that most subsidies entering the TAR leave almost 
immediately via the trade account or through various other 
forms of monetary outflow from the region, accentuating 
the delinking of such flows from locally-oriented forms 
of accumulation and producing a highly polarized form of 
growth as a result.
In this sense, while the various western development 
strategies since the mid-1990s were quite successful in 
reversing the trend of worsening provincial inequalities in 
the first two decades of the reform period, this outcome was 
achieved through a sharpening of economic polarization within 
western China. In the TAR especially, heavy dependence on 
subsidies led to an excessively urban-centric strategy up to the 
15. This is a matter of informed speculation, as military activity is a 
closely guarded secret in China. See Fischer (2005: 44-45).  
16. See Fischer (2009b: 44-48) for further details on data, although the 
calculations here have been updated with more recent data from equivalent 
tables in CSY (2009). 
entirety of GDP increase in certain years, such as 80 percent 
of GDP increase in 1996, 87 percent in 2002, or 73 percent in 
2005 (despite the ongoing railway construction in that year). 
The experience of the TAR was starkly dissimilar to all 
other provinces of western China, including Qinghai, the 
next most similar province to the TAR in terms of topography 
and demography. Subsidization strategies in all other western 
provinces were focused on intensively restructuring the 
antiquated industrial base left over from Maoist interior 
industrialization strategies of the 1960s and 1970s. In all 
these cases, intensive subsidization and construction activity 
bolstered the leading role of industry within a few years. In 
China as a whole, secondary industry (including mining, but 
only as a very minor share) was generally the largest sector 
driving growth throughout the 1990s and 2000s, amounting 
to over 40 percent of GDP. Construction actually shrank from 
6.1 of GDP in 1995 to 5.7 percent in 2008 despite the evident 
construction boom in China. The share of the tertiary sector 
increased considerably in the late 1990s, settling at just over 
40 percent by 2008.12 These patterns were broadly similar 
in most western provinces, albeit with a stronger role of the 
tertiary sector and construction since 2000, reflecting the 
larger role of subsidies and investment under the OWC.13 
In contrast, rapid growth in the TAR has been based on 
rapid tertiarization and a construction boom alongside a small 
and constant GDP share of secondary industry. Moreover, the 
composition of the tertiary sector in the TAR again contrasts 
with the rest of China. While the share of government and 
party agencies in the tertiary sector of the TAR has always 
been the highest in China, at around 20 percent in the 
mid-1990s, it surged in 2000 and 2001 to over 26 percent, 
becoming the largest component of the tertiary sector in those 
two years and accounting for over 13 percent of total GDP in 
2001, or almost twice the entire mining and industrial activity 
and close to the total construction activity. Government 
administration had effectively become the engine of growth 
in the opening years of the OWC. By 2003 it stabilized at 
11 percent of GDP, after which the disaggregated tertiary 
GDP data at the provincial level ceased to be reported in 
the yearbooks. Indirect indicators suggest that government 
administration continued to play a leading role throughout 
the 2000s, probably more than even tourism, which was 
nonetheless skyrocketing in the 2000s (see Fischer 2009b: 
41-42).14 In comparison, government administration in China 
accounted for only 2.3 percent of total GDP in 2003, while it 
accounted for 7.5 percent in Qinghai. The high share in the 
TAR (as well as in Qinghai and Xinjiang) probably indirectly 
reflects—in part—the relatively large military and/or security 
Table 1-12). For more details, see Fischer (2009b). 
12. All data calculated from CSY (2009: Table 2-1).
13. See Fischer (2007) for more detail on Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and 
all China.
14. According to data presented by TAR governor Padma Choling, 
tourist numbers in the TAR (mostly domestic Chinese) rose from 1.9 million 
in 2006 to 6.82 million in 2010 (Tibetinfonet 2011). Tourists would have 
exceeded the total population of the TAR of about 2.8 million in 2007.
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early 2000s, relative 
to other Chinese 
provinces where 
u r b a n - r u r a l 
inequality was 
already considered 
to be high by 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
standards. These 
trends  in urban-
rural inequality are 
shown in Figure One 
above, measured 
in terms of the 
ratio of per capita 
urban disposable 
household income 
(of households 
registered as 
p e r m a n e n t l y 
residing) over 
per capita rural 
household income, 
both deflated by 
their respective 
urban and rural provincial consumer price indices. This 
measure reflects that the take-off of the TAR in the mid-1990s 
was primarily urban and excessively de-linked from the local 
rural economy; urban-rural inequality reached the dizzying 
height of 5.5 in 2001, i.e. the average urban per capita 
household income was 5.5 times higher than the average 
rural per capita income—a level never before observed at a 
provincial level in the PRC.
Urban-rural polarization in the TAR was just as sharply 
rectified from 2001 to 2006, at least back down to the level of 
urban-rural inequality observed in the TAR in the mid-1990s 
and converging with the upper range of generally-increasing 
urban-rural inequality across the rest of western China up to 
2008. This sharp correction in part reflects strong growth in 
per capita rural incomes after 2002, most likely due to a variety 
of rural development initiatives to increase rural incomes 
from 2003 onwards, such as those discussed by Childs et al 
(2011) in this issue and Goldstein et al (2008; 2010). It also 
partly reflects the fact that per capita urban incomes stagnated 
in 2005 and 2006, possibly due to an apparent respite in the 
otherwise rapidly increasing money wages of urban state-
sector staff and workers in the TAR in these two years, which 
in turn account for a large part of the dynamics observed in 
average urban incomes of the TAR (see further discussion 
of this in the third section). The sharp correction in urban-
rural inequality also likely reflects the urbanization of the 
local labor force and the probable metamorphosis of previous 
urban-rural inequality into intra-urban inequality as the 
newly emerging schism driving polarization and stratification 
in this province, as discussed in the next sections. 
LABOR TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF RAPID 
SUBSIDIZED GROWTH  
According to the official aggregate employment data and 
relative to the rest of China, the TAR labor force (mostly 
Tibetan) experienced one of the latest and, once started, 
fastest transitions out of agriculture from the late 1990s 
onwards. This transition is shown in Figure Two below, with 
reference to shares of the labor force employed in the primary 
sector (mostly farming and herding) from 1990 to 2008. 
The primary labor share of the TAR stood at 81 percent in 
1990, then the most agrarian labor force in China. The share 
remained at 76 percent in 1999 (still the most agrarian of 
China), but then started to fall sharply with the beginning of 
the OWC in 2000, to 65 percent in 2003 and 56 percent in 
2008.
The proportional shift of labor out of the primary sector 
was more gradual in China and Sichuan, albeit still rapid 
from a comparative international perspective. In China, the 
primary share fell from 60 percent in 1990 to a plateau of 
about 50 percent in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and then 
fell sharply from 2003 onwards, to just below 40 percent 
by 2008. The share in Sichuan dropped from 73 percent in 
1990 to 61 percent in 1999 and then to 45 percent by 2008. 
In contrast, the shift started later and more suddenly in the 
TAR as well as in Qinghai, the province with the next highest 
proportion of Tibetans in its population (see Fischer 2008). 
An equivalent drop in share of about ten percentage points 
occurred in all of the provinces shown from 2003 onwards 
(besides Gansu). However, the overall pace of change in the 
TAR since 1999 has been exceptional. About 20 percent 
of the local (mostly Tibetan) TAR labor force moved out of 
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Figure 1: Urban-rural inequality, selected provinces, constant 2008 yuan. Sources: calculated from CSY (2009: Tables 
8-5, 10-15 and 10-21) and equivalent in previous yearbooks.
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introduction, some rural migrants might be registered as 
employed in secondary or tertiary activities even though they 
still spend part of a year working in farming or herding. On 
the other hand, much labor migration might be also hidden 
from these data, such as when farmers migrate to urban 
areas for six months a year in search of temporary work but 
otherwise remain registered as rural residents working in the 
primary sector. On balance, these data are probably accurate 
in a rough sense, in terms of reflecting real changes in socio-
economic structure, as corroborated by the field insights of 
myself and other scholars (as noted above). 
To a large extent, the shift of the labor force out of 
agriculture in Tibetan areas implies urbanization, much more 
so than other regions of China, given the scarcity of off-farm 
rural employment opportunities in the Tibetan areas relative to 
more central and coastal areas of China, where much off-farm 
employment remains in rural areas. The recent (and heavily-
subsidized) surge in rural entrepreneurship and employment 
(as discussed by Childs et al, 2011, in this issue) has attenuated 
this trend in the TAR to a certain degree. Nonetheless, despite 
the prevalence of entrepreneurial activities in the three villages 
surveyed by Childs et al, labor migration still remained the 
most prevalent emerging livelihood strategy for households 
even in the most “entrepreneurial” of these villages. Moreover, 
in their similar research reported in Goldstein et al (2008: 
522), urban labor migration to Lhasa, Shigatse or the local 
county seat accounted for about half of the overall labor 
migration in these three villages. Rural-rural labor migration, 
such as on infrastructure projects or housing construction, 
accounted for the other half of labor migration, albeit these 
three villages are located relatively close to a major city 
(Shigatse) and hence would have been relatively privileged in 
agriculture in as little as nine 
years, more or less converging 
with the norm of other poor (but 
much more densely populated) 
provinces such as Gansu and 
even falling below the share in 
Yunnan (not shown here). 
Moreover, the declining 
share in the TAR appears to 
represent a stabilizing of the 
absolute numbers of Tibetans 
working in farming and herding 
despite ongoing population 
growth. The absolute number 
working in the primary sector 
in the TAR reached its peak 
in 1999 at 922,000 people, 
after which the number fell 
to 850,000 in 2003, although 
it then gradually increased to 
893,000 in 2008. Some 
of these changes probably 
reflect adjustments to 
estimates after the 2000 census or else reclassifications and 
even actual resettlements in the beginning of the OWC. 
Nonetheless, the slow increase in this number since 2003—
around half a percent per year—is significantly less than the 
rate of rural population increase, which was well over one 
percent over these years, or an even faster rate of growth 
in the working age population.17 Indeed, this demonstrates 
that even in the context of falling fertility and substantial 
shifts to off-farm employment, population momentum can 
nonetheless result in declining per capita landholdings, 
thereby exacerbating other problems, such as stagnant grain 
prices (see Goldstein et al 2003 and 2008; Fischer 2005: 
94). These absolute numbers are significant because they 
reflect that the remarkably rapid transition in the local labor 
structure out of agriculture has been happening regardless of 
the effect that non-Tibetan (i.e. Han Chinese) out-of-province 
migrants might have had on the overall employment shares 
of the TAR. Besides temporary migrants working as vegetable 
farmers in cities such as Lhasa or Shigatse, most of who are 
probably not reflected in these statistics, very few of these 
migrants come to the TAR to work in agriculture.
Notably, these data probably both under and overestimate 
actual trends. For instance, on one hand some of these 
trends might reflect administered changes in registration 
status that exaggerate actual socio-economic changes, i.e. 
people are reclassified as urban residents even though they 
might continue to farm or herd. Similarly, as noted in the 
17. The TAR has the highest rate of population increase in China, 
although fertility started to fall sharply in the 1990s (see Childs 2008; Fischer 
2008), Hence, the “youth bulge” in the population structure (see Childs 
2008: 266) started reaching the working age in the 2000s (considered as age 
16 years and older in the employment statistics). 
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Figure 2: Share of Labor in Primary Sector, selected provinces, 1990-2008. Sources: CSY (2009: Table 4-4) and 
equivalent tables in previous yearbooks.
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terms of off-farm rural employment generation. In this light, 
the predominant trend in the TAR overall has likely been 
towards a relatively rapid urbanization of the local TAR labor 
force
The difference between the rural and primary sector shares 
of total employment can be used as a proxy measure to reflect 
these off-farm rural trends. There is a difference—often even 
in trend—between the shares of total rural employment and 
primary sector employment. This difference could be taken as 
a very rough proxy for rural off-farm employment although, 
as discussed above, some of this difference might represent 
misclassifications of people who have migrated to urban areas 
but have maintained their registration status in the rural areas 
(and even in the primary sector) and hence are counted as 
part of the rural employed (or vice versa). 
Comparing Figure Three with the previous Figure Two 
on primary labor shares, it is apparent that a much stronger 
shift out of rural employment took place in the TAR than in 
other western provinces, implying that the transition out of 
agriculture has involved much faster urbanization of the local 
labor force than elsewhere in western China. For instance, the 
share of rural employment in the TAR fell almost 11 percent 
between 1998 and 2008, or about half of the almost 21 percent 
drop in the primary employment share over these same years. 
Notably, this corroborates with the above-mentioned survey 
results of Goldstein et al (2008: 522), in which about half 
of the respondents who were “going for income” were doing 
so by migrating to urban areas, whereas about half migrated 
to other rural areas. As a result, the TAR ended this period 
with a much less rural labor force than in Sichuan or Gansu, 
converging with Qinghai and approaching the national 
average. In contrast, in Qinghai, the next most similar 
province to the TAR in terms of population and topography, 
the rural employment share only fell 0.5 percent over this 
period—albeit it started this period with a much lower rural 
employment share than most other western provinces, almost 
on par with the national 
average—whereas the 
primary sector share fell 
almost 17 percent. If 
these data are accurate, 
almost the entire 
proportional shift of labor 
out of the primary sector 
in Qinghai was absorbed 
by other types of rural 
employment. Similarly, 
there was only a four 
percent drop in the rural 
share of Sichuan despite 
the 17 percent drop in the 
primary share, resulting 
in a surprisingly rural 
province (at 80 percent 
of total employment in 
2008) despite the sharp reduction in primary share to 45 
percent, which was close to the national average and probably 
reflects strong rural off-farm employment generation 
over these years. Thus, while the Sichuan labor force was 
less urbanized than that of the TAR, it was also much less 
agrarian. In Gansu, the rural share actually increased by 2 
percent, alongside a slight decline in the primary share of 6 
percent. Nationally, trends between these two shares were 
broadly correspondent over this period, with the rural share 
falling 8 percent while the primary share fell 10 percent. In 
sum, among the western cases shown here, the TAR shows 
the strongest shedding of primary sector employment outside 
of the rural areas altogether. 
If the rural employment share can be taken as a rough 
proxy of urbanization,18 it also suggests that the TAR has 
been experiencing some of the most rapid urbanization over 
this period, albeit starting from a low urbanization rate of 
almost 20 percent according to the 2000 census (including 
temporary migrants), or 15 percent for Tibetans only. In other 
words, the relative scarcity of off-farm rural employment in 
the TAR (and other Tibetan areas) implies that movements 
out of agriculture involve relatively greater movements to 
towns and cities, and that urban labor markets are relatively 
much more central to labor transitions in the Tibetan areas 
than in other parts of western China. 
The difference between rural and primary shares also 
suggests that there was a substantial increase in the share of 
rural off-farm labor in the TAR in the early years of the OWC, 
although less so than in other western provinces (and keeping 
in mind that this measure can be considered as a generous 
indication of off-farm rural employment, as discussed above). 
The difference in rural and primary shares rose from 6 percent 
of total TAR employment in 1998 to 14 percent in 2003, 
18. The measurement of urbanization is very problematic in China 
given that urban definitions are quite different in each of the five censuses 
(see Yixing and Ma 2003; Fischer 2008). 
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Figure 3: Share of labor classified as rural, selected provinces, 1990-2008. Sources: calculated from CSY (2009: Tables 4-2 
and 4-4) and equivalent in previous yearbooks.
70 HIMALAYA  XXX (1-2) 2010
even after the completion of the railway construction in 
2006. This corresponds with the boom in rural construction 
activity generated by the Comfortable Housing Project (CHP) 
under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which started in 2006 (see 
Goldstein et al 2010). 
Notably, about two-thirds of this secondary employment 
in the TAR in 2008 was in construction and one-third was 
in manufacturing. Despite the recent hype regarding mining 
in Tibet, mining and quarrying accounted for a very small 
share of three percent of secondary employment (although 
employment in this sector might be dominated by migrant 
workers, many of whom might not be included in these data). 
In contrast, most other provinces typically show the inverse, 
i.e. nationally, two-thirds of secondary employment was in 
manufacturing, 20 percent in construction and 10 percent 
in mining/quarrying, or else 44 percent, 44 percent and 10 
percent in Sichuan. Qinghai was closer to the TAR in this 
respect, with construction surpassing manufacturing. 
Moreover, 70 percent of the construction employment 
and 50 percent of the manufacturing employment in the TAR 
was in rural areas in 2008. Again, this could represent the 
relatively large amount of activity that was generated by the 
CHP, from construction to a related range of relatively small-
scale processing activities such as brick making for the CHP 
(again, see Childs et al in this issue). Indeed, these data reflect 
efforts by the government to stimulate off-farm employment 
and thereafter stabilized at around 16 percent.19 The OWC 
thereby appears to have generated a substantial share of non-
agricultural employment in the rural areas, particularly after 
2002, albeit to a lesser extent than in other western provinces 
or the national average, as would be expected of a sparsely-
populated remote area with “primate” towns and cities. This 
would be the result of intensive efforts to raise rural incomes 
through the provision of rural employment opportunities in 
the TAR through intensive subsidization, particularly since 
2003, as discussed by 
Childs et al (in this issue) 
and Goldstein et al (2008; 
2010). 
Transition out of 
agriculture and, for the 
large part, into urban areas 
has resulted in an equally 
rapid transition towards 
tertiary employment 
in the TAR, largely 
bypassing employment 
in the secondary 
sector (especially 
manufacturing). Figure 
Six below presents the 
changing trends of the 
share of secondary sector 
employment in total 
employment of the five 
cases discussed, along with 
some highlighted data on 
the resulting composition 
of secondary employment 
in 2008 (in the text boxes 
embedded in the figure). 
Figure Five presents the 
same for tertiary sector 
employment. 
The share of secondary employment in the TAR is 
significantly lower than in all other cases, as was historically 
the case (see Fischer 2005) and would be expected of a 
sparsely populated and remote region. Nonetheless, there 
was a notable increase in share following the beginning of 
the OWC, particularly between 2002 and 2003 when the 
share rose from 6.2 percent to 9.1 percent. This corresponds 
with the beginning of major railway construction in the TAR 
and related OWC projects. The increase was sustained and 
rose further to more than ten percent in 2007 and 2008, 
19. An alternative proxy measure, based on the combination of three 
categories of rural employment (township and village enterprises, rural 
private enterprises, and rural self-employed individuals) as a share of total 
employment, shows a much lower generation of rural off-farm employment 
and a greater gap in the share of such employment compared to other 
western provinces or the national average. This alternative measure is 
probably overly restrictive, although the broad observations it offers are also 
consistent with the analysis here. 
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71
in rural areas, although we do not know the degree to which 
out-of-province (Han Chinese) migrants are included in these 
data—particularly in urban construction and even in some 
rural construction activities (such as the railway versus the 
CHP). Also, once rural employment is deducted from overall 
secondary employment, the sheer paucity of urban secondary 
employment is striking, despite the construction boom over 
these years. Again, this might be reflective of the fact that 
much of the urban construction activity employed out-of-
province temporary migrants, who might not be recorded by 
these data sources. 
Despite these signs of increasing secondary employment 
in the rural areas of the TAR, such employment nonetheless 
remained much more limited than elsewhere in China and the 
increase in the secondary employment share by 5.5 percent 
from 1999 to 2008 only accounted for a minor fraction of the 
decline in the primary share over the same period by 20.2 
percent. The bulk of the declining primary share (about three 
quarters) was absorbed by the tertiary sector, which rose from 
a share of around 18 percent of total employment in 1998 to 
34 percent in 2008. Indeed, the tertiary share rose so rapidly 
in the TAR over this period that it surpassed the national 
average share in 2008, on par with Qinghai. Despite quite 
divergent patterns in the 1990s, all western provinces and the 
national average had more or less converged at a very similar 
tertiary share by 2008.
However, the composition of such tertiary employment 
was very different across the various provinces, revealing a 
very distinct labor structure in the artificially-subsidized urban 
economy of the TAR 
versus the much more 
productivity-driven 
urban economies 
of China proper. 
Nationally, the two 
largest categories of 
tertiary employment 
were in the salaried 
public sector 
(roughly defined, 
a c k n o w l e d g i n g 
that the boundaries 
between public and 
private are often quite 
blurred in China); 
education accounted 
for 24 percent of 
tertiary employment 
in 2008 and “public 
m a n a g e m e n t ” 
( p r e v i o u s l y 
“government and 
party administration”) 
accounted for 21 
percent. With health 
and social welfare (nine percent), the combined share 
was above fifty percent. This might be seen as a sensible 
approach to employment generation in China, particularly 
in circumstances where manufacturing absorbs relatively 
less and less labor per value of output and where education 
systems produce a surplus of increasingly well-educated 
people. Despite China’s status as a rising mercantile nation, 
the tertiary category of trade only accounted for eight percent 
of tertiary employment, which was less than even health and 
social welfare. 
In contrast, all three western provinces detailed here 
(Sichuan, Qinghai and TAR) displayed much larger shares 
of tertiary employment in trade and hotel and catering, and 
much smaller shares in public management, education and 
health. However, the TAR was exceptional in its combination 
of a fairly large share for public management at 14 percent 
of tertiary employment (albeit this was less than the national 
average and was probably much more oriented towards 
the security apparatus than would be the case nationally), 
together with a very large share in trade (27 percent). Only 
seven percent of tertiary employment was in education and 
three percent in health and social welfare. Hotel and catering 
in the TAR accounted for less than public management, at 
ten percent of tertiary employment in 2008, which was also 
less than the employment shares of hotel and catering in both 
Sichuan and Qinghai despite the enormous boom in tourism 
in the TAR in the 2000s. Some of these patterns might reflect 
the employment effects of the protests in Lhasa and beyond 
in spring 2008, although these protests and an earthquake 
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Figure 5: Tertiary sector employment shares, 1990-2008. Sources: same as above.
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sectors of the urban tertiary sector, in partnership with a small 
strata of Tibetan elites (see Fischer 2008). However, we do not 
have access to data that would allow for a proper evaluation of 
this likely scenario. In contrast, the relative GDP/labor ratio 
of the primary sector was 0.43 in 1999 (75.9 percent of labor 
accounting for 32.4 percent of economic activity), which then 
fell to 0.27 by 2008 (55.7 percent of labor accounting for 15.3 
percent of economic activity). The fall in this ratio indicates 
marginalization of this sector from the value-added norm of 
the economy even despite the rapid transfer of labor out of 
the primary sector. In other words, more transfer of labor out 
of the primary sector would have been required to match the 
speed of growth in the rest of the TAR economy. 
The ratio of these ratios—that is, the tertiary GDP/labor 
ratio over the primary GDP/labor ratio—can be taken as a 
measure of the relative productivity of the tertiary sector vis 
a vis the primary sector (as opposed to the previous ratio, 
which measures the productivity of each sector relative to the 
average in the economy as a whole). This tertiary/primary 
ratio rose from 5.3 in 1999 to 5.9 in 2008, meaning that 
the average employed person in the tertiary sector in 2008 
accounted for 5.9 times more value-added than the average 
employed person in the primary sector. The increasing ratio 
gives an indication of the degree of imbalance and on-going 
sectoral polarization in the local economy—despite growth 
in all sectors—and the degree to which such polarization 
has served as an underlying economic driver of rapid labor 
transitions and urbanization. This is reflective of the nature 
of unbalanced rapid growth in the TAR, driven by extremely 
intense subsidization concentrated in construction22 and 
urban services, which has resulted in unabated sectoral 
polarization despite the very rapid shift of local labor out of 
farming and herding. 
Whether or not sectoral polarization results in increasing 
inequality across households is more difficult to judge 
without more detailed data given that a household might 
include a farmer, a construction worker and a trader or even 
public employee among its members. The equalization in 
urban-rural inequality since 2001, as discussed in the first 
section, has occurred in large part because of the increasing 
integration of rural households into secondary and tertiary 
sector work. However, the distribution of value-added within 
each of these sectors might also be quite polarized. For 
instance, rural people employed in the rural tertiary sector 
(e.g. in a rural clinic or school) would account for a much 
smaller share of tertiary value-added than their counterparts 
in urban areas because of the relatively low salaries earned 
in such rural tertiary work, compared to equivalent salaries 
in the urban tertiary sector, which match those of Beijing or 
Shanghai. Similarly, it would be interesting to disaggregate 
these data to measure imbalances across the sub-sectors 
of the tertiary sector into which urbanizing rural Tibetan 
22. The relative GDP/labor ratio of construction is even higher than 
the tertiary sector, albeit for much smaller GDP and labor shares (see Fischer 
2007: 176-181).
also effected Qinghai and Sichuan. Notably, these categories 
of employment in the TAR—public management, trade and 
hotel/catering—tend to be dominated by migrant (particularly 
Han Chinese) workers, who are probably recorded in public 
sector employment data but much less so in the private sector 
data (such as in catering).
ECONOMIC POLARIZATION
The rapid increase in the tertiary employment share over 
the 2000s is a predictable outcome of the rapid growth of the 
tertiary sector in the TAR economy, which came to account 
for almost 56 percent of GDP in 2008, up from 45 percent 
in 1999, as discussed in the first section. Thus, the rapid 
labor transition has, to some extent, balanced the imbalance 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s between a very large 
tertiary GDP share and a much smaller tertiary employment 
share. Nonetheless, this balancing within the tertiary sector 
has been accompanied—remarkably—by continuing 
sectoral polarization (i.e. a divergence in the value-added 
“productivities” across sectors)20 between the primary 
and secondary/tertiary sectors of the TAR given the very 
imbalanced nature of growth focused on construction and 
tertiary services. Notably, sectoral polarization need not occur 
if labor transfers proportionately into more rapidly growing 
sectors, thereby equalizing out value-added productivities 
across the economy, as has happened with labor transfers out 
of agriculture in Europe. However, this has not (yet) happened 
in the TAR. It also has not (yet) happened in China, although 
sectoral polarization in China has been led by manufacturing 
while the tertiary sector has played a compensating role. 
Polarization in the TAR has been predominantly led by 
construction and tertiary services. 
Tertiary-led sectoral polarization can be represented by 
relative GDP/labor ratios.21 At the beginning of the rapid labor 
transition in the TAR in 1999, 19 percent of the TAR labor 
force was employed in the tertiary sector, accounting for 45 
percent of the GDP of the TAR, and resulting in a relative 
GDP/labor ratio of 2.3. By 2008, 34 percent of the labor force 
was employed in the tertiary sector, accounting for 56 percent 
of GDP and resulting in a ratio of 1.6. The reduction in this 
ratio indicates balancing between the GDP and labor shares 
of the tertiary sector and equalization between this sector and 
the average of the economy over these years. Out-of-province 
non-Tibetan migrants probably accounted for a much larger 
share of tertiary employment and of tertiary value-added in 
2008 than in 1999 due to rapid net in-migration to urban 
areas over this period and the fact that Han Chinese migrants 
have tended to increasingly dominate the most lucrative 
20. GDP value-added is generally used as a proxy for measuring 
productivity, even though it represents a combination of output and prices/
wages. 
21. I use the term “relative GDP/labor ratio” to indicate the value-added 
contribution per employed person in each sector relative to the average in the 
economy as a whole (i.e. GDP/total employment). A ratio of more than one 
means that a unit of labor contributes more than its share of value-added; and 
less than one means the opposite.   
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migrants tend to enter, versus those sectors dominated by 
Han Chinese migrants, versus those sectors dominated by 
privileged Tibetan and Han Chinese cadres, although data are 
not available for this exercise. 
These speculative extrapolations for the TAR are nonetheless 
particularly salient because the size of the tertiary sector in 
the TAR, combined with its high value-added per employed 
person relative to other sectors and even other provinces, 
not only influences local labor transitions and urbanization, 
it also drives out-of-province migration into the relatively 
lucrative sectors of the TAR such as trade, commerce, tourism 
and catering. Indeed, the high value-added GDP contribution 
of government administration—perhaps the largest GDP 
category of the tertiary sector in the TAR, as discussed in the 
first section—is directly due to the instituted wages of state-
sector staff and workers, and such public employment in the 
TAR appears to have become increasingly dominated by non-
Tibetan non-locals (see below). Thus, increasing polarization 
within the urban areas of the TAR in the confluence of these 
local and out-of-province migration flows could underlie the 
balancing of the overall tertiary sector.  
Intra-urban polarization can be represented by a round-
about proxy method that I innovated in Fischer (2007). A 
proxy measure is necessary because intra-urban inequality 
is difficult to evaluate on the basis of conventional data. 
Annual household income surveys only sample households 
registered as permanently-residing, thereby excluding most 
migrants. Moreover, tabulated income distribution data from 
urban household surveys are irregularly provided for the TAR 
and other western provinces, making trend analysis difficult. 
However, two sources of data that are available in most years 
can be used to circumvent these limitations: average money 
wages of staff and workers, and per capita urban disposable 
incomes. “Staff and workers” are a relatively privileged 
sub-category of urban employment in China, referring to 
persons working (permanently or on contract) in units of 
state ownership, collective ownership, joint ownership, share 
holding ownership, and foreign ownership (including Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan).23 Up until recently, there has been 
no publicly available data for wage rates other than for staff 
and workers, i.e. none has been available for those in the 
lower strata of the urban labor hierarchy, such as construction 
workers not working under contract. The money wages 
of staff and workers would cover many of the privileged 
temporary migrants working in the state-sector of the TAR 
and other Tibetan areas, typically for terms of two to three 
years. In contrast, urban household disposable incomes are 
derived primarily (almost entirely in the TAR) from salaries 
and wages earned by all households registered as permanently 
or long-term residing (i.e. not including temporary migrants) 
23. Staff and workers do not include persons employed in township 
or private enterprises, urban self-employed persons, retirees, re-employed 
retirees, teachers in the schools run by local people, foreigners, persons from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and other persons not included by “relevant 
regulations” (CSY 2005, Explanatory notes for Chapter Five).
from all forms of employment, not only staff and workers. 
In others words, urban household incomes reflect an average 
of all forms of remuneration earned by all urban residents 
registered as permanently-residing (about three-quarters 
Tibetan in the TAR according to the 2000 census). 
The comparison of average wages of staff and workers 
to average per capita urban household incomes can give an 
indirect indication of wage inequality between the privileged 
upper strata of urban employees (including some migrants 
and about half of the registered urban workforce in the 
TAR) and the average of all (permanently-registered) urban 
residents. Average money wages would be marginally higher 
than per capita urban household incomes even in a relatively 
egalitarian setting given that per capita household calculations 
include both working and dependent household members. 
Rising inequality, however, can be inferred by a rising ratio. 
Figure Six below shows this proxy measure of urban wage 
inequality for a selection of western provinces from 1998 to 
2008. 
Figure Six reveals a sharp polarization of urban wage 
inequality in the TAR since 2000, to a level far above the 
next most unequal province of Qinghai (according to this 
measure). The ratio of staff and worker wages to urban 
disposable incomes in the TAR rose from 1.9 in 1999 to a 
high of 4.1 in 2007, and then fell slightly to 3.8 in 2008, 
in contrast to 2.6 in Qinghai, 2.2 in Gansu, 2.0 in Sichuan 
and 1.9 for China as a whole. In light of the dynamics in 
urban-rural inequality discussed at the end of Section One 
and urbanization discussed in Section Two, these findings 
suggest that intra-urban inequality has taken over from 
urban-rural inequality as the main schism of stratification in 
the TAR under the conditions of rapid urbanization since the 
early 2000s.
Two main trends explain this sharp rise in urban inequality. 
A rising wage/income ratio could represent rising wages of 
staff and workers relative to the average of all urban wages. 
Or, it could represent a falling share of staff and worker 
employment in total urban employment (among households 
registered as permanently-residing), thereby reducing the 
weight of staff and worker wages in average urban incomes. 
Both cases appear to apply to the TAR. 
First, the money wages of staff and workers in the 
TAR, which were always above the national average due to 
“hardship” considerations,24 rose even faster than the national 
average. They almost doubled between 1999 to 2002, from 
12,962 yuan to 24,766 yuan, and then almost doubling again 
to 47,280 yuan by 2008. From 2002 onwards, these average 
wages in the TAR were among the three highest in China, 
jockeying for position with Beijing and Shanghai, and around 
double the average in China.25 The sharp increases represent 
24. The TAR ranks at the highest of 11 levels in a ranking of so-called 
‘hardship” posts in public sector employment in China (‘hardship” defined 
according to a lowland Han Chinese perspective).
25. Calculated from CSY (2009: Table 4-23) and equivalent in previous 
yearbooks.
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Tibetan cadres outnumbered Tibetan cadres for the first 
time since 1980. Government assertions that Tibetans were 
the dominant beneficiaries of increasing state-sector wages, 
thereby contributing to an emerging “middle class” of 
Tibetans,28 became much more tenuous at that time. Rather, 
Tibetan employment was shrinking during these early years 
of the OWC in precisely the parts of the economy that were 
growing fastest, i.e. the urban state-sector. 
Conversely, many of the non-Tibetans employed in the 
state-sector were probably temporary residents on short terms 
of official duty in the TAR. Therefore, many were probably 
not included in any of the household income data, although 
they would have been reflected in the wage data (and possibly 
in some of the employment data). Nonetheless, it is implicit 
within these data that local, permanently-registered Tibetan 
urban residents bore most of the brunt of rising inequality in 
these early years of the 2000s, primarily by being squeezed 
out of state-sector employment. As a result, the sharp wage 
increases were increasingly and disproportionately captured 
by non-Tibetans and by a shrinking share of permanently-
registered urban households, which also helps to explain 
the growing divergence between average wages of staff and 
workers and urban per capita household incomes up to 2003. 
We cannot state whether this has continued to be the case 
after 2003 given the lack of data, although these dynamics 
definitely provide much insight into the outburst of protests 
that took place in Lhasa and elsewhere in March 2008. 
Notably, per capita urban disposable household incomes in 
the TAR—which had been consistently above the national 
28. See PRC (2001). For an academic version this argument, see 
Sautman and Eng (2001).
an implicit upward revaluation of hardship compensations 
for staff and workers that has been exclusive to the TAR over 
this period. 
While Beijing has generally taken an approach of rapidly 
raising money wages as a means to stimulate consumption 
in China, there are varied opinions as to why the already-
privileged wages in the TAR would have been raised so much 
faster at the beginning of the OWC. Some argue that this 
was meant to garner the loyalty of local Tibetan cadres and 
the so-called “emerging Tibetan middle class”. Others argue 
that it was to make the TAR more attractive for Chinese staff 
and workers considering a working sojourn in the region, 
particularly given the increased demand for skilled labor in 
various OWC projects. Both considerations have probably 
motivated these wage policies. 
S e c o n d , 
these sharp wage 
increases took place 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y 
with a reduction 
in the number and 
share of Tibetan 
staff and workers 
in state-owned 
units between 
2001 and 2003, 
while the number 
of non-Tibetans 
rose (Fischer 2007, 
204). Unfortunately, 
we have no idea 
of these trends 
since 2003 because 
this particular 
disaggregation of the 
staff and worker data 
was discontinued 
after TSY (2004).26 
However, we can 
ascertain that the fall in staff and worker employment in 
state-owned units was not compensated by a rise in staff and 
worker employment in non-state-owned units, as was the 
case elsewhere in China where reductions in the state-sector 
were matched by increased private-sector employment. To 
the contrary, the state-owned share of total staff and worker 
employment in the TAR actually rose from 92.2 percent in 
2000 to 94.5 percent in 2008.27 In any case, the shift in 2003 
revealed a sudden move away from Tibetan representation 
in urban public employment, i.e. from the most privileged 
and formalized forms of employment in the TAR, and non-
26. Coincidentally, I published a report on these data in early 2005 (see 
TIN 2005) on the basis on data provided in TSY (2004). The subsequent TSY 
(2005) no longer reported this data. 
27. Calculated from CSY (2009: Table 4-8) and equivalent in previous 
yearbooks. 
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average throughout the reform period—fell below the 
national average for the first time in 2004 and even stagnated 
in current value in 2005 and 2006 (i.e. declining in real 
value, after accounting for inflation), thereafter joining the 
ranks of other poor western urban economies such as Gansu 
and Sichuan.29 This lagging was in stark divergence from the 
increasing wages of staff and workers. The divergence implies 
either a compositional effect that continued after 2003 (i.e. a 
shrinking share of permanently-registered urban households 
were employed in state-sector employment, as discussed 
above), or else that the incomes of the permanently-registered 
urban households without state-sector employment (about 
half of the workforce in 2004 and mostly Tibetan) were 
increasingly lagging behind, if not falling in real terms, 
thereby downwardly compensating for the sharp rises in 
average money wages of staff and workers. This could have 
been the case if, for instance, lay offs from the state sector led 
to long bouts of unemployment. Obviously, those Tibetans 
who did manage to retain state-sector employment have done 
very well.
Outside of the state-sector, the whole array of so-called 
“spontaneous” migrants (i.e. migration not organized by the 
state, as it is referred to in the scholarship on China) are not 
included in either the household surveys or the staff and 
worker data. They might be at least partially included in 
the general aggregate employment data, although this needs 
to be verified. Based on qualitative field insights, informed 
speculation and some secondary sources such as the work by 
Ma and Lhundup (2008) on temporary migrants in Lhasa, 
these migrants include Han Chinese, Chinese Muslim, or 
even Tibetans from other parts of Tibet, who largely come 
on their own initiative to ply their trades independently in 
the urban areas, such as businessmen, construction workers, 
shoe menders, restaurant owners, cooks, tailors, rickshaw 
or taxi drivers, sex workers, or even beggars. Such migrants 
are not necessarily competing for staff and worker positions 
in the state-sector, although high state-sector wages do offer 
some indication of the subsidy-instituted affluence in the 
urban areas of the TAR relative to the conditions found in 
most other areas of western, central or even coastal China, 
which in turn attract these migrants. 
It is difficult to deduce the impact of these migrants on 
inequality. However, it is precisely the confluence of these 
different streams of migrants in the Tibetan urban areas, 
together with local urbanizing rural Tibetans and permanently-
registered urban Tibetans, that sets the playing field for intense 
competition over urban employment opportunities. Given 
that these opportunities are overwhelmingly determined by 
the centrally-directed subsidization policies that have driven 
almost the entirety of rapid urban-centered economic growth 
in the TAR, they are characterized by strong linguistic, cultural 
and political modes of bias deriving from the dominant Han 
Chinese group in control of most power and most financial 
29. Calculated from CSY (2009: Table 9-15) and equivalent in previous 
yearbooks.
flows from outside the province. These biases include 
Chinese fluency, Chinese work cultures, and connections to 
government or business networks in China Proper. In turn, 
local Tibetans severely lag behind Han Chinese migrants 
in terms of education, particularly at secondary levels of 
education where Chinese fluency and literacy are mostly 
obtained by Tibetans. This results in strong disadvantages for 
Tibetans competing in these urban labor markets of the TAR, 
even despite the rapid increase in primary school enrolments 
since the mid-1990s.30
CONCLUSION
This article focused on rapid labor transitions in the 
context of rapid growth and economic polarization. Section 
One outlined some of the main structural features of rapid 
economic growth in the TAR since the 1990s up to 2008 
in comparison to other selected western Chinese provinces. 
Section Two analyzed in more detail the rapid labor 
transitions that occurred alongside such growth, namely, 
a rapid structural shift out of agriculture. Part of this shift 
was absorbed by off-farm employment within rural areas, 
particularly in construction activities. However, about three 
quarters of the shift was absorbed by the tertiary sector and 
a substantial share—perhaps more than half—transferred to 
urban areas. The speed of these transitions was so fast that, by 
2008, the share of tertiary sector employment in the TAR was 
equivalent to the average national share in China, reaching 
34 percent of total employment (versus 56 percent in the 
primary sector). The third section then examined aspects of 
sectoral polarization in the TAR. Despite the rapid transfer of 
labor from the primary to the tertiary sectors, the value-added 
per employed person has continued to diverge between 
these two sectors, reflecting the intensity of the tertiary and 
construction focus in recent subsidization strategies since the 
late 1990s, which respectively came to account for 56 percent 
and 22 percent of GDP by 2008. These trends arguably 
constitute a crucial pull factor for both local urbanization and 
inter-provincial migration. The invigoration of a rural focus 
in development policy since the beginning of the OWC in the 
TAR and especially since 2006 under the Eleventh Five Year 
Plan has attenuated the trend of rising urban-rural household 
income inequality by providing a significant boost to rural off-
farm employment in construction and small-scale production 
(as analyzed by Childs et al in this issue). However, a sharp 
increase in intra-urban inequality also appears to have 
paralleled the attenuation of urban-rural inequality over 
this period, suggesting that intra-urban inequality has taken 
over from urban-rural inequality as the dominant locus of 
polarization and stratification in the TAR over these years. 
In other words, underlying some heavily-subsidized silver 
linings in the rural areas (if the rapidity of the changes in 
these areas is to be taken as positive), there has been a broader 
30. For detailed discussion on these last two points, see Fischer (2009a; 
2009b). 
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Moreover, the fact that these exclusionary experiences operate 
along educational, linguistic or cultural modes of disadvantage 
provides the basis for strong cross-class perceptions and 
expressions of grievance. Hence, while the average Tibetan 
standard of living has probably improved throughout all of 
these rapid transitions, a focus on marginal improvements 
misses the point because it distracts attention away from 
larger dynamics in the regional economy, within which 
those who are marginally improving are being progressively 
marginalized from the more lucrative parts of the economy 
and levers of decision making, even while becoming more 
dependent on the employment generated by the subsidies 
producing such affluence. 
The dilemma is that the rapid labor transitions that are 
being induced by such growth strategies are very real, in terms 
of the radical transformation of people’s lives and sources of 
livelihoods. Indeed, the speed of transition itself calls into 
the question the subsidization strategy; slower change might 
render people more capable of self-determined adaptation, 
whereas the dependence of the emerging employment 
structure on subsidies is so great that the prospect of such 
subsidies one day drying up is very worrisome. In light of 
such predicaments and to the extent that many of these 
structural socio-economic changes prove to be irreversible, as 
discussed in the introduction, the prioritizing of preferential 
employment generation in the Tibetan areas for local Tibetan 
people is urgently needed as a means to avoid rapidly 
emerging pockets of urban marginalization within these rapid 
labor transitions. 
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